Concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en la empresa familiar : un enfoque de gobierno corporativo

Julio Pindado, Ignacio Requejo, Chabela De la Torre

Resumen


Dada la importancia de las empresas familiares en todo el mundo, nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es investigar la relación entre concentración de propiedad y valor de mercado en elcaso particular de las compañías familiares. Además, estudiamos si las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares. Para lograr este objetivo, adoptamos un enfoque de gobierno corporativo. La estimación de nuestros modelos mediante el método generalizado de los momentos proporciona nueva evidencia empírica. Nuestros resultados revelan que la propiedad familiar influye positivamente en el valor empresarial. No obstante, cuando laconcentración de propiedad en manos de la familia es demasiado elevada, el valor de la compañía disminuye; dando lugar a un relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad familiar y valor de mercado. Finalmente, demostramos que las empresas familiares obtienen mejores resultados que las no familiares, incluso cuando se tiene en cuenta la mencionada no linealidad. En general, losresultados obtenidos indican que el control familiar de las empresas puede ser beneficioso para los accionistas minoritarios.

Given the importance of family firms all over the world, our main objective in this paper is to investigate the relation between ownership concentration and the market value of the company inthe particular case of family firms. Additionally, we study whether family firms outperform nonfamily corporations. To this aim, we adopt a corporate governance approach. The estimation of ourmodels by using the generalized method of moments provides new empirical evidence. Our results show that family ownership impacts positively on firm value. Nevertheless, when ownership concentration in the hands of the family is too high, firm value decreases; thus giving rise to a nonlinear relation between family ownership concentration and firm value. Finally, we find that familyfirms perform better than non-family ones, even when nonlinearities are taken into account. Overall, our findings suggest that family control of corporations may be beneficial to minority shareholders.

Palabras clave


Empresa familiar; Concentración de propiedad; Valor de mercado; No linealidades; Gobierno corporativo; Datos de panel; Family firm; Ownership concentration; Firm value; Nonlinearities; Corporate governance; Panel data

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18002/pec.v0i2011.754

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